Photo caption: President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Keir Starmer wave as they board Air Force One on 28 July 2025 in Prestwick, Scotland. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)
*Announcements on technology could offer promising areas for partnership – but progress on Ukraine and Gaza seems unlikely.
President Trump lands in London on 17 September for his second state visit, the first time in UK history a foreign leader has been accorded this honour twice.
A UK state visit – consisting of a formal invitation from the monarch to a foreign head of state – are relatively rare events. Over the past two decades, the UK has hosted only one to two such visits annually. Carefully choreographed affairs that seek to showcase the depth of a relationship, they’re a culmination of months, if not years, of coordination between capitals.
Much like the 2019 visit, the three days will be filled with ceremony, symbol, and protests. It may also be more substantive this time around, showcasing the robust technology and economic agenda the two leaders have shaped in recent months. But major diplomatic breakthroughs, on Gaza or Ukraine, likely remain beyond reach.
Advancing an affirmative US–UK Tech agenda
A landmark US–UK tech partnership is rumoured as the major visit deliverable, offering a common approach to AI, quantum computing, and rare earth minerals. Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, OpenAI’s Sam Altman, and Apple’s Tim Cook may join for the launch. Given the UK’s strong research institutions, skilled tech workforce, and burgeoning AI startup ecosystem, it’s a natural partnership for the US, which sees AI primacy as a major geostrategic strength.
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Investments in UK datacenters and defence sector collaboration may follow, measures aimed to secure supply chains and limit China’s control over the minerals fuelling the AI revolution. An agreement on nuclear power generation, bringing new investments and advanced modular reactors online, aims to power AI datacenters and, according to Starmer, ‘drive down household bills in the long run’.
This agenda may address some of the hardware and research inputs. But it will not easily resolve the range of regulatory and content differences across the Atlantic. London may reportedly agree to language emphasizing the importance of free speech, an area of bilateral friction sparked by the UK’s Online Safety Act.
It remains to be seen whether this partnership can truly supercharge transatlantic cooperation on AI – or whether its strength lies in its signalling.
Deepening trade relations with Washington…and Beijing
The UK–US trade deal, much heralded in May, is imperative for a struggling UK economy. It is also a huge political prize for both countries as the first deal of its kind announced with the new administration in Washington.
But much work remains to shape the initial set of trade terms into a detailed, operative economic prosperity deal. The five-page sketch out pledged to cut tariffs to 10 per cent on some British cars and eliminate the 25 per cent tariff on UK steel and aluminium, among other measures. Pieces of the deal have been operative since June. London and Washington now have the heady task of hammering out implementation details on market access, digital trade, nontariff barriers, and economic security.
“The UK’s recent reopening of trade talks with China…may raise questions in Washington about London’s economic orientation and complicate trade discussions.”
At a time when US trade negotiators are likely stretched thin with other deals at an earlier developmental stage, Trump’s visit could help sustain negotiating momentum. The president has also pledged to ‘look at’ dropping 10 per cent reciprocal tariffs, an opening the UK will surely seize upon during the visit. (The legal basis of the 10 per cent tariffs will now come before the US Supreme Court in November).
The deal requires the UK to ‘promptly meet’ requirements on ‘security of the supply chains’ of steel and aluminium, reportedly designed to target investment from China. Given these US sensitivities, the UK’s recent reopening of trade talks with China – the first since 2018 – may raise questions in Washington about London’s economic orientation and complicate trade discussions.
=== Chatham House ===
